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The North-South divide in Europe: an economic anomaly or more of an 
existential question? 
 
Introduction 
The recent bailout attempts have been putting Europeans through their paces. True, in view of 
a ‘Grexit’ recipe which could endanger the future of the Union, the Eurozone managed to 
remain intact. The likelihood of making concessions to Athens, for instance debt cancellation, 
was fraught with a bigger danger, as it was capable of irritating other fragile economies where 
the nationals were told to have no better choice than the northern prescription of austerity 
measures (The Economist 2015). More so than anything else, however, the public standoff 
between Greece and the rest of the 19-country currency zone hinted at an intriguing cleft 
beneath the surface. 
 
The mutual accusations reaching off limits between the media, politicians and intellectuals 
were not evocative of an old East-West distinction, as formerly practised throughout the last 
enlargement process, for instance.
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 The historical animosities cited copiously in recent times 
pertained to the North-South axis for the most part, with the Member States holding 
disproportionate institutional competences on both sides. Recent economic indicators explain 
why. To the statistics reviewing the first quarter of 2015, the top six unemployment rates 
came from Greece (25.6 %), Spain (22.5 %), Cyprus(16%), Croatia (15.8%), Portugal 
(13.2%) and Italy (12.4%), all of which are cases from the Union’s southern members, with 
their scores way above the EU-28 average of 9.8% (European Commission 2015b). 
Regardless of the enormous share of youth unemployment in these figures –over 50% in 
Greece and Spain - the early 2015 figures showed additionally that the highest rates of 
government debt to GDP were as of the end of 2014 exclusive to the southern members  
again, with 177.1% of Greece, 132.1% of Italy and 130.2% of Portugal at the top (European 
Commission 2015a). 
 
Granted, these were alarming rates for a lopsided EU economy, the issue is yet not about 
production/consumption of goods and services only. To the latest public opinion surveys 
comparing perceptions of shared values across the EU (EB 69 and 77), the number of 
respondents believing in Member States’ proximity declined the most in Portugal (by 23%), 
                                                 
1
 To illustrate, Germany’s top political executives were depicted time and again as Nazi officers in several Greek 
papers for allegedly playing the main part in the crisis. The response in the German press was again one of 
stereotyped thinking: Greeks were the lazybones in Europe (Wearden 2015), in fact members of the third-world. 
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Slovenia (18%), Spain (18%), Cyprus (16%) and Greece (15%) (European Commission 
2012). Added to that, the highest feelings of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in 
the European Union were expressed in Greece (72%), Portugal (66%), Cyprus (61%), Italy 
(59%) and Spain (52%), where citizens declared to hold in a parallel vein the lowest level of 
trust for EU institutions lately (European Commission 2014). 
 
To be fair, the growing lack of faith in authorities across the South is not reserved for the EU 
institutions only. The countries where trust in the regional/local authorities declined at most 
were Spain (24%), Croatia (23%), Greece (21%) and Italy (13%) (ibid.). In close connection, 
the voter preferences in the South shifted towards ‘anti-system’ political parties on the left 
wing, while citizens in the North allied themselves increasingly with parties to the right. With 
these explicit symptoms in mind, one could certainly argue for a rise of polarisation as to how 
citizens conceive of the European Union in its two regions. 
 
The North-South divide in political science is essentially attributable to theories sorting 
structural positions like ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’ and ‘periphery’ in the world system 
(Wallerstein 1984; Amin et al. 1990). Despite approaches questioning the validity of the term, 
due to transformation of the global economy (Eckl and Weber 2007) which required 
reconceptualisation of global inequalities not via status of development but reclassification of 
the Third World (Therien 1999; Escobar 2004; McFarlane 2006) or class (Newell 2005; 
Barnett 2007), the North-South divide is almost always associated with the major paradigms 
of political economy to distinguish, broadly speaking, the rich and developed countries in the 
North from the poor and underdeveloped countries in the South. A categorisation of this sort 
could in fact be too facile for there are developing/underdeveloped countries in the Northern 
hemisphere like those across the Balkans, just as there are in the South a better-off cluster 
including New Zealand and Australia. Such inconsistencies notwithstanding, the divide is 
today largely consulted as a shorthand to refer to distribution of wealth/poverty or 
political/economic decision-making capacities across the globe (Smith et al. 2014). 
 
The latter-mentioned principle applies to the EU context quite fittingly. Regardless of a wide 
array of small and big countries with varying levels of economic and/or political 
development, the North-South divide is here also used as a point of reference to describe 
wealth distribution as well as how political/economic decision-making capacities are dealt out 
across a Union of 28 members. In essence, this benchmarking has its origin as “a particularly 
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salient feature of the European political space in the EU-15 period” (Thomson 2011, p. 74). A 
number of studies probing into the mode of operation in the EC/EU Councils over that period 
unveiled numerous occasions where the northern and southern Member States mingled rather 
amongst themselves (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Elgström 2003; Naurin and Lindahl 2008; 
Kaeding and Selck 2005). To some, this formation was somewhat obscured by the 2004/2007 
enlargement waves (Köhler and Begega 2007; Huber et al. 2015). Nonetheless, a series of 
empirical data measuring the post-2004 period of the Council meetings concluded that the old 
cooperation pattern was still in order, that is, the new Member States coalesced either with the 
old members in the north or those in the south (Thomson 2011; Veen 2011), which was a 
tendency to put the East-West demarcation on the backburner. 
 
Besides being a convenient shorthand for the fundamentals of economic order, the North-
South split has also served as a yardstick to flesh out the EU’s oft-critiqued ‘normative’ 
foreign policy. The so-called ‘Barcelona Process’ following  the 1995 Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership was for instance a source of inspiration for scholarship to discuss how a host of 
historical patterns in the South stimulated discursive practices to launch a Mediterranean 
identity (Gillespie 1999; Bicchi 2006; Pace 2007). There were, other than that, publications in 
reference to politics/policies of environment (La Spina and Sciortino 1993; Yearley et al. 
1994; Pridham and Cini 1994; Börzel 2000; Eder and Kousis 2000), immigration and asylum 
(Castles 2004; Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Bommes and Sciortino 2011) as well as social 
policies (Leibfried 1993; Guillén and Matsaganis 2000; Ferrera 2005) chiefly arguing that it 
was more often than not the southern Member States who dragged their heels when it came to 
adopting a common framework. 
 
That being said, demarcations around the EU’s North-South axis have to date been largely 
informed by unequal economic capabilities, given the asymmetrical distribution of wealth 
across Europe. Despite a long record of regional schemes, such as cohesion policies adopted 
to iron out structural differences (Ederveen et al. 2006; Hagen and Mohl 2009; Baun and 
Marek 2014), their effectiveness has usually been discredited. This became even more so 
evident with the recent Eurozone crisis, as it featured far more adverse effects in the EU’s 
emerging economies (EMEs), where the strongest fiscal contractions belonged to countries in 
the South (Gligorov et al. 2012; Landesmann 2013).   
 
Aim, scope and methodology 
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In view of the growing poverty divide between the Eurozone’s northern and southern 
members recently (European Commission 2014), its implications for a permanent split 
between citizens of the two regions deserve critical scrutiny. To contribute empirical data to 
that end, this study set out to probe into EU citizens’ views of each other by carrying out a 
survey in two northern EU members, namely Germany and the Netherlands, from 15 March 
to 30 April 2015. The selection of the two lands is based on their leading roles during the 
Greek bailout talks recently, which with their huge trade surpluses appeared to be the staunch 
advocates of austerity measures in the single-currency zone (The Telegraph 2015). The term 
‘northern EU Member States’ was taken here to cover EU members to the north (and west) of 
Europe, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Austria, Germany, France and the UK, while the southern European states were essentially 
typified by Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS), as the four major members to the south 
of the Union (Landesmann ibid.). 
 
Given the recent debt crisis which provoked far-reaching debates not only about the fate of 
the Eurozone but also the solidarity of EU countries, there were serious concerns over a 
growing resentment between citizens of the EU’s northern and southern Member States. A 
growth of reserved feelings as such is taken to deny the hypothetical argument in what may be 
called the null-hypothesis (h0) in this study. Accordingly, Member State citizens residing in 
the two regions would not necessarily hold wariness toward each other: 
 
h0: There are at present no significant signs of resentment between the northern 
and southern Member State citizens. 
 
 
The alternative hypothesis would obviously argue the other way around:  
 
 
ha: There are at present significant signs of resentment between citizens of the  
northern and southern Member States. 
 
 
To test the null hypothesis above, with the assumption that it is true, a questionnaire was 
devised for use as part of household interviews in Germany and the Netherlands. It consisted 
of closed questions inquiring about how Europe/European Union was conceived of by citizens 
of the northern and southern Member States and, more importantly, how these two sides 
viewed each other in the wake of the recent Eurozone crisis. Six questions were formulated to 
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investigate the subject matter: (1) The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide 
between the north and south of the EU; (2) The northern EU Member States’ support for more 
tax increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage European 
solidarity; (3) The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of their 
commitment to the European Union; (4) The European Union would be better off without 
weak economies like southern Member States; (5) I am not prejudiced against nationals from 
southern EU Member States in this country; and (6) The cultural, social, economic or political 
practices of southern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country. 
 
For these six questions, a scale of six choices of responses was readily composed: ‘I strongly 
agree’, ‘I agree’, ‘I disagree’, ‘I strongly disagree’, ‘I neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘I do not 
know/I do not want to answer’. Out of these six options were three main feedback categories 
intended: agreement (as framed through ‘I strongly agree’ and ‘I agree’), disagreement (‘I 
disagree’ and ‘I strongly disagree’) and other responses (‘I neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘I 
do not know/I do not want to answer’). Ultimately, before a thorough data analysis, the six 
choices of responses were reduced to three, according to which the responses ‘I strongly 
agree’ and ‘I agree’ were grouped under ‘agreement’; ‘I disagree’ and ‘I strongly disagree’ 
under ‘disagreement’ and the rest under ‘other’. 
 
The investigated areas briefed above demanded responses of categorical and non-numerical 
data. A fitting statistical method of analysis to test the null-hypothesis in accordance was 
taken to be Pearson’s chi-square test of independence. The level of significance employed 
between significant and non-significant findings to that effect was 5%, where p< 0.05. 
 
Research design 
For the target population of 120 participants, the estimated response rate was 60%. The 
number of household lists taken as samples was duly increased, which demanded 80 more 
addresses to be visited, adding up to 200 altogether (counted through 100x120/60). The 
survey was carried out in Berlin and Amsterdam, the capital cities of the selected countries, in 
consideration of the residents’ demographic distribution, as informed by NUTS 2010/EU-27 
(European Commission 2011). The primary sampling units (PSU) in each city were located 
by taking into account where the resident populations were mostly diversified. These were 
identified in Berlin as Neukölln and in Amsterdam as Geuzenveld-Slotermeer. The selection 
of research participants in these districts was systematic: for the private household, every third 
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apartment/house number in the two randomly chosen streets of these districts; for the 
identification of research participants in the households, the first person in alphabetical order. 
 
A pre-notification letter was sent to the 200 potential participants in each selected capital city. 
Even if the intended 120 interviews could be obtained earlier, all precontacted addresses were 
visited as a matter of courtesy. Some of the potential respondents turned out to be away on the 
visiting days, while others declined to participate in the survey or were unable to qualify for 
taking part due to illness, underage etc. The overall target population was chosen from the 
first 120 of the successfully interviewed samples in total. 
 
The sampling was based on random selection and assignment, in compliance with cluster/area 
sampling. Accordingly, half of the participants (60) were to hold the citizenship of Germany 
or the Netherlands, depending on where the interview was carried out, while the other half 
(60) needed to be the nationals of Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain, as the core countries 
representing the EU’s South in the two hosting countries. For maximisation of responses and 
interaction with the participants in the most natural way possible, native speakers with 
interviewing experiences accompanied the surveys. The preset sample profile necessitated 
choosing only one resident person from each of the private household visited, falling into one 
of the three age groups: adolescents (aged between 15-17), young adults (18-29) and adults 
(30 and above). Due to their varying institutional services, a uniform pick of sampling frames 
was not feasible across the participating countries. The sampling frame used in Germany was 
informed by the Statistical Offices at the municipal level, which in the Netherlands was drawn 
from the PTT (postal delivery points). The resources in both countries proved to be reliable, 
owing to their frequent updates and wide coverages. 
 
For optimisation of the interviews, the ‘back-translation’ technique was employed. Often used 
in Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, this procedure was indeed a measure taken in case 
the target household could not demonstrate an adequate level of English proficiency, which 
would require responding to the questionnaire items (most probably) in the native languages. 
To that end, a professional translator changed the questionnaire into the target language, 
depending on the target household’s profile. This text was then changed by another 
professional translator back into English, without having seen the original questionnaire. 
Comparison, and if needed modification, of the wording in both versions were ultimately 
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made in order to ensure quality during translation in German, Dutch, Greek, Spanish, 
Portuguese and Italian, as the official languages of the participating samples. 
 
Findings 
 
Germany 
 
Of the 200 addresses to which the prenotification letters were sent, 125 private households 
were interviewed successfully. On 12 visiting days in total, 23 of the precontacted potential 
participants refused to take part in the survey, 38 of them were found to be away and 14 
others ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. This amounted overall to a 
response rate of 62.5%. 
 
The three age groups of the 120 survey respondents were represented in Germany by 28 
adolescents, 40 young adults and 52 adults, amounting to 64 males and 56 females. Those 
who turned to hold a higher level of education here, that is, a tertiary degree from a vocational 
school or university (including that of a post-graduate/doctorate) were 87, while 33 
participants reported as the rest to have a secondary or a lower degree of education. The 
number of the unemployed out of a total 120 participants in Germany was 24. 
 
When reviewed in terms of citizenship, these counts demonstrated that the distribution of 
Germans and GIPS citizens was largely divergent. The participants from GIPS turned out to 
be older than those of the nationals, who, compared to the former, were represented by a 
wider population of females. Likewise, as regards education, the number of GIPS participants 
who declared to hold higher degrees at the tertiary level was 49, by comparison to 38 German 
citizens with reportedly similar degrees. Finally, the ratio of the unemployed between the two 
groups was twice as big (8 jobless counts of GIPS citizens versus 16 of the German 
participants): 
 
Table 1: Survey participants according to age, gender, level of education and status of employment in Germany 
(n total: 120, n German citizens: 60 + n GIPS citizens: 60) 
 
Citizenship 
Age groups Gender Level of education Status of employment 
Total 
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German 
citizens 
20 22 18 26 34 22 38 44 16 60 
GIPS citizens 8 18 34 38 22 11 49 52 8 60 
Total 28 40 52 64 56 33 87 96 24 120 
 
 
The interviews in Germany brought out fairly disparate findings. While these were by no 
means close to the mean, as the high standard deviations came to indicate, there was not much 
evidence for similar patterns shared by the two sample groups: 
 
Table 2: Distribution of responses on a six-category scale in Germany 
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1. The recent 
Eurozone crisis 
mirrors a 
permanent divide 
between the north 
and south of the 
EU* 
20 29 2 1 3 5 10 11,66 10 28 5 3 6 8 10 9,14 
2. The northern EU 
Member States’ 
support for more 
tax increases and 
spending cuts in the 
southern EU 
Member States 
damage European 
solidarity 
2 9 8 31 4 6 10 10,60 10 20 11 8 8 3 10 5,62 
3. The Member 
States in the north 
and south are very 
similar in terms of 
their commitment 
to the European 
Union 
8 13 22 10 4 3 10 6,96 4 2 17 25 5 7 10 9,03 
4. The European 
Union would be 
better off without 
weak economies 
like southern 
Member States 
17 11 9 3 8 12 10 4,65 6 5 15 18 8 8 10 5,25 
5. I am not 10 20 11 7 7 5 10 5,37 8 4 27 12 4 5 10 8,88 
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prejudiced against 
nationals from 
southern EU 
Member States in 
this country 
6. The cultural, 
social, economic or 
political practices 
of southern 
Europeans do not 
fit into the way of 
living in this 
country 
7 22 8 6 10 7 10 6,03 7 7 10 17 11 8 10 3,79 
* The survey participants were briefly reminded that the EU Member States in the north (or northern EU Member States) 
covered Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, France and the UK while 
those in the south (or southern Member States) were limited to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the responses obtained throughout the interviews were essentially 
meant to disclose three general feedback categories in the end: agreement, disagreement and 
other responses suggesting abstention, failure and/or refusal to provide answers. In 
interpreting the patterns on the six-response scale above (‘I strongly agree’, ‘I agree’, ‘I 
disagree’, ‘I strongly disagree’, ‘I neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘I do not know/I do not 
want to answer’), for this reason, an abridged form of three categories was reconsidered under 
‘agreement’ (representing ‘I strongly agree’ and ‘I agree’), ‘disagreement’ (‘I disagree’ and ‘I 
strongly disagree’) and ‘other’ (standing for the remaining choices symbolising abstention/no 
response): 
 
Table 3: Responses in Germany (abridged) 
 
Questions Categories 
German 
citizens 
GIPS 
citizens 
Total 
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide 
between the north and south of the EU 
 
Agreement  49 36 85 
Disagreement 3 8 11 
Other 8 16 24 
Total 60 60 120 
2. The northern EU Member States’ support for more tax 
increases and spending cuts in the southern EU Member 
States damage European solidarity 
Agreement  11 30 41 
Disagreement 39 19 58 
Other 10 11 21 
Total 60 60 120 
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar 
in terms of their commitment to the European Union 
 
Agreement  21 6 27 
Disagreement 32 42 74 
Other 7 12 19 
Total 60 60 120 
4. The European Union would be better off without weak 
economies like southern Member States 
Agreement  28 11 39 
Disagreement 12 33 45 
Other 20 16 36 
Total 60 60 120 
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5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from northern EU 
Member States in this country 
 
 
Agreement  30 12 42 
Disagreement 18 39 57 
Other 12 9 21 
Total 60 60 120 
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of 
northern Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this 
country 
Agreement  29 14 43 
Disagreement 14 27 41 
Other 17 19 36 
Total 60 60 120 
 
 
Based on a reduced form, the responses to all questions revealed a high level of divergence 
between the two sample groups’ preferences. The most similar patterns of responses 
concerned the first question (on consideration of the recent Eurozone crisis to be a permanent 
divide between the EU’s North and South) where the German citizens’ tendency proved to be 
much higher than that of the GIPS citizens, although the choices of agreement outweighed 
those of disagreement, abstention or neutrality on both sides (49 vs 36). The second 
question’s inquiry about whether or not the northern EU Member States’ support for further 
austerity measures had negative implications for European solidarity (where the German 
respondents’ 11 choices of agreement and 39 of disagreement were somewhat 
counterbalanced by the GIPS citizens’ 30 of agreement and 19 of disagreement) and the 
fourth question’s investigation of a European Union without weak economies like southern 
Member States on the other side (to which the German participants returned with 28 choices 
of agreement and 39 of disagreement versus 11 choices of agreement and 33 of disagreement 
belonging to the participants from GIPS) were indeed where the split was most obvious to 
observe. Likewise, prejudice against southern EU nationals in Germany, as tackled by the 
fifth question, similarities between the North and South in terms of their commitment to the 
EU (as explored by the third question) and the sixth question’s inquiry about their cultural, 
social, economic or political practices’ compatibility with those of Germans disclosed equally 
significant accounts of divergence between the respondents of the two regions. 
 
Before carrying out the statistical analysis on the basis of the observed frequencies above, the 
expected counts were calculated according to ‘row total x column total / grand total’ (as 
marked by the 3x4 shaded grids in Table 3). The test statistic performed according to ‘χ2= ∑ 
(observed counts – expected counts)2/expected counts’ generated the P-values below, given 
the 5% level of significance and 2 degrees of freedom (as identified by ‘number of rows – 1 x 
number of columns – 1’): 
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Table 4: P-values according to observed and expected counts of responses in Germany 
 
Questions Categories 
German citizens GIPS citizens 
P-values Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors 
a permanent divide between the 
north and south of the EU 
Agreement 49 42,5 36 42,5 
0,0313 Disagreement 3 5,5 8 5,5 
Other 8 12 16 12 
2. The northern EU Member States’ 
support for more tax increases and 
spending cuts in the southern EU 
Member States damage European 
solidarity 
Agreement 11 20,5 30 20,5 
0,0004 
Disagreement 39 29 19 29 
Other 10 10,5 11 10,5 
3. The Member States in the north 
and south are very similar in terms of 
their commitment to the European 
Union 
Agreement 21 13,5 6 13,5 
0,0041 Disagreement 32 37 42 37 
Other 7 9,5 12 9,5 
4. The European Union would be 
better off without weak economies 
like southern Member States 
Agreement 28 19,5 11 19,5 
0,0001 Disagreement 12 22,5 33 22,5 
Other 20 18 16 18 
5. I am not prejudiced against 
nationals from southern EU Member 
States in this country 
Agreement 30 21 12 21 
0,0004 Disagreement 18 28,5 39 28,5 
Other 12 10,5 9 10,5 
6. The cultural, social, economic or 
political practices of southern 
Europeans do not fit into the way of 
living in this country 
Agreement 29 21,5 14 21,5 
0,0088 Disagreement 14 20,5 27 20,5 
Other 17 18 19 18 
 
 
The Netherlands 
Following Germany, the second leg of the survey was conducted in the Netherlands. For the 
200 addresses to be called on in total (as prenotified by letters to reach the target population of 
120, given the 60% preestimated response rate), 121 visits were fruitful. It took 10 days to 
complete the intended visiting plan, which drew to a close with 33 of the precontacted 
potential participants as missing, 24 of them refusing to take part in the survey and 22 others 
being recorded as ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. This amounted overall 
to a response rate of 60.5%. 
 
The 120 participants in the Netherlands were made up of 25 adolescents, 49 young adults and 
46 adults, amounting to 56 males and 64 females. Of these, 84 were holding degrees from 
tertiary level schools as opposed to 36 who had a high school degree at the most. The ratio of 
the employed to the unemployed in these was around 3 to 1, represented by 91 and 29 
participants, to be precise. 
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When considered on the basis of citizenship, these counts revealed that the age groups did not 
show much of a difference. Yet, the same could not be said of gender. The level of education 
amongst GIPS citizens was much higher: 47 of them reported to have a degree from a 
vocational school/university as opposed to 37 participants representing the Dutch citizens in 
the same way. Similarly, the ratio of the employed between the two groups was about 4 to 5 
in favour of the GIPS citizens (41 to 50 counts): 
 
Table 5: Survey participants according to age, gender, level of education and status of employment in the 
Netherlands 
 
Citizenship 
Age groups Gender Level of education Status of employment 
Total 
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Dutch 
citizens 
14 26 20 22 38 23 37 41 19 60 
GIPS citizens 11 23 26 34 26 13 47 50 10 60 
Total 25 49 46 56 64 36 84 91 29 120 
 
 
Against this background of sample profiles, the Dutch leg of the survey brought out largely 
dissimilar findings between the two groups of respondents. The values of standard deviations 
proved to be similarly high for both groups, yet their responses of agreement/disagreement 
were not really alike: 
 
Table 6: Distribution of responses on a six-category scale in the  Netherlands (n total: 120, n Dutch citizens: 60 + 
n GIPS citizens: 60) 
 
Questions 
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1. The recent 
Eurozone crisis 
17 27 2 2 5 7 10 10,00 12 18 10 9 6 5 10 4,69 
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mirrors a 
permanent divide 
between the north 
and south of the 
EU* 
2. The northern EU 
Member States’ 
support for more 
tax increases and 
spending cuts in the 
southern EU 
Member States 
damage European 
solidarity 
5 7 25 11 5 7 10 7,67 10 20 12 7 4 7 10 5,62 
3. The Member 
States in the north 
and south are very 
similar in terms of 
their commitment 
to the European 
Union 
12 11 18 12 3 4 10 5,62 2 2 20 22 10 4 10 9,03 
4. The European 
Union would be 
better off without 
weak economies 
like southern 
Member States 
9 9 7 8 17 10 10 3,58 5 11 16 12 10 6 10 4,05 
5. I am not 
prejudiced against 
nationals from 
southern EU 
Member States in 
this country 
15 13 10 10 8 4 10 3,85 7 7 20 17 7 2 10 6,93 
6. The cultural, 
social, economic or 
political practices 
of southern 
Europeans do not 
fit into the way of 
living in this 
country 
12 15 6 6 9 12 10 3,63 9 11 10 15 8 7 10 2,83 
* Like in Germany, the survey participants in the Netherlands were also briefly reminded that the EU Member States in the 
north (or northern EU Member States) covered Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, 
Germany, France and the UK while those in the south (or southern Member States) were limited to Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain. 
 
As performed in the German case, the above-given distribution on a scale of six categories of 
responses was eventually reconsidered in the Dutch leg on the basis of three categories only, 
signifying choices of agreement, disagreement and the others: 
 
Table 7: Responses in the Netherlands (abridged) 
 
Questions Categories 
Dutch 
citizens 
GIPS 
citizens 
Total 
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between 
the north and south of the EU 
 
Agreement  44 30 74 
Disagreement 4 19 23 
Other 12 11 23 
Total 60 60 120 
2. The northern EU Member States’ support for more tax increases Agreement  12 30 42 
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and spending cuts in the southern EU Member States damage 
European solidarity 
Disagreement 36 19 55 
Other 12 11 23 
Total 60 60 120 
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in 
terms of their commitment to the European Union 
 
Agreement  23 4 27 
Disagreement 30 42 72 
Other 7 14 21 
Total 60 60 120 
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies 
like southern Member States 
Agreement  18 16 34 
Disagreement 15 28 43 
Other 27 16 43 
Total 60 60 120 
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from northern EU Member 
States in this country 
Agreement  28 14 42 
Disagreement 20 37 57 
Other 12 9 21 
Total 60 60 120 
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of northern 
Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country 
Agreement  27 20 47 
Disagreement 12 25 37 
Other 21 15 36 
Total 60 60 120 
 
 
A quick browse across the abridged table manifests a predominant divide between the two 
sample groups’ preferences. The most similar pattern observed here concerned the fourth 
question, inquiring about whether or not the European Union would be better off without 
weak economies like southern EU members. To that, both sample groups agreed with close 
frequencies (18 by the Dutch and 16 GIPS citizens), although their choices of disagreement 
differed in broad terms (28 responses by GIPS citizens vs 15 by the Dutch). The responses to 
whether or not the recent Eurozone crisis marked a permanent divide between the EU’s North 
and South (as inquired by the first question) and the fifth question’s probe into prejudice 
against southern EU nationals in the Netherlands did not really exhibit similar tendencies 
between the sample groups (44 and 28 choices of agreement and 4 and 20 of disagreement by 
the Dutch respondents as opposed to 30 and 14 of agreement and 19 and 37 of disagreement 
by the GIPS citizens). Given the counts of their preferences, though, the Dutch and GIPS 
citizens differed at most in matters concerning the northern EU Member States’ support for 
more austerity measures in the southern EU Member States and its consequences for 
European solidarity and similarity of Member States in terms of their commitment to the 
European Union, as investigated by way of the second and third questions (with 12 and 23 
counts of agreement by the Dutch versus 30 and 4 by GIPS citizens, respectively). Finally, the 
sixth question on compliance of southern EU nationals’ cultural, social and political practices 
with those of the Dutch revealed also a marked split between the Dutch and GIPS samples. 
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While the choices of agreement indicated a relatively narrower margin here (compared to 27 
Dutch citizens who stated that the southern Europeans did not comply with the Dutch way of 
life, the number of GIPS citizens who responded in the same was 20), the two groups’ 
preferences for disagreement were not at all close to each other: 12 Dutch vs 25 GIPS citizens 
did not agree on the investigated lack of compliance between the two sides. 
 
Following the calculation of the expected counts on the basis of the observed frequencies 
above, the test statistic in the Netherlands introduced the P-values below: 
 
Table 8: P-values according to observed and expected counts of responses in the Netherlands 
 
Questions Categories 
Dutch citizens GIPS citizens 
P-values Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a 
permanent divide between the north 
and south of the EU 
Agreement 44 37 30 37 
0,0020 Disagreement 4 11,5 19 11,5 
Other 12 11,5 11 11,5 
2. The northern EU Member States’ 
support for more tax increases and 
spending cuts in the southern EU 
Member States damage European 
solidarity 
Agreement 12 21 30 21 
0,0015 
Disagreement 36 27,5 19 27,5 
Other 12 11,5 11 11,5 
3. The Member States in the north and 
south are very similar in terms of their 
commitment to the European Union 
Agreement 23 13,5 4 13,5 
0,0001 Disagreement 30 36 42 36 
Other 7 10,5 14 10,5 
4. The European Union would be 
better off without weak economies like 
southern Member States 
Agreement 18 17 16 17 
0,0324 Disagreement 15 21,5 28 21,5 
Other 27 21,5 16 21,5 
5. I am not prejudiced against 
nationals from southern EU Member 
States in this country 
Agreement 28 21 14 21 
0,0062 Disagreement 20 28,5 37 28,5 
Other 12 10,5 9 10,5 
6. The cultural, social, economic or 
political practices of southern 
Europeans do not fit into the way of 
living in this country 
Agreement 27 23,5 20 23,5 
0,0367 Disagreement 12 18,5 25 18,5 
Other 21 18 15 18 
 
 
Comparative assessment and discussion 
 
The EU’s oft-cited North-South divide was explored in this study at the level of public 
opinion. The research scope was limited for this purpose to the mutual perceptions of northern 
and southern Member State citizens, as investigated through a string of closed questions. 
While the use of closed questions offered convenience of time and data quantification, there 
might have been more complex attitudes/opinions the participants failed to voice as a result of 
the chosen method of inquiry, given constraints over their responses by way of six questions 
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on a scale of readily-summarised six choices only. Put differently, it may be the case that 
some issues were covered at the expense of others by this way, leaving the depth of analysis 
somewhat uneven. 
 
That being said, breaking down the research scope on the basis of survey questions, one could 
track down the essentials of current debates surrounding the divide between the EU’s northern 
and southern members. The questions were formulated in close association with the recent 
Eurozone crisis, even if some like the first, second and fourth questions made more direct 
references than the others such as the sixth question, which expanded the economic roots of 
the friction into the cultural, social and political areas. The third question sought to understand 
in a similar vein whether or not an obvious level of proximity was perceivable between the 
northern and southern Member States as far as their commitments to the Union were 
concerned. And the fifth question aimed to refute/confirm the existence of prejudice between 
citizens of the two sides, although these might not necessarily be based on personal 
experiences. 
 
Before making a conclusive analysis of the findings on the basis of these questions, one needs 
to remember that neither the nationals of the host countries nor those from GIPS were one of a 
kind. Barring the ethnocultural disparities held in all likelihood, nevertheless, the responses 
from the northern and southern EU Member State citizens in the study appeared to be fairly 
coherent within each sample group. Cross-comparison of samples, that is, comparison of 
GIPS citizens’ responses in Germany and the Netherlands on one side and those of the 
nationals on the other revealed relatively intercompatible patterns, albeit with a few 
exceptions concerning the GIPS nationals’ responses to the first and second questions in 
Germany, which could differ from those of the Dutch nationals in the Netherlands as many as 
8 counts of agreement and 11 of disagreement. Likewise, on the side of nationals, responses 
to the first question by GIPS citizens brought out 5 more counts of agreement in Germany 
than those in the Netherlands: 
 
Table 9: Cross-comparison of sample group responses in Germany and the Netherlands 
 
Questions Categories 
Sample groups 
German 
nationals in 
Germny 
Dutch 
nationals in 
the 
Netherlands 
GIPS 
citizens in 
Germany 
GIPS citizens 
in the 
Netherlands 
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a Agreement  49 44 38 30 
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permanent divide between the north and 
south of the EU 
Disagreement 3 4 8 19 
Other 8 12 14 11 
Total 60 60 60 60 
2. The northern EU Member States’ 
support for more tax increases and 
spending cuts in the southern EU 
Member States damage European 
solidarity 
Agreement  11 12 22 30 
Disagreement 39 36 19 19 
Other 10 12 19 11 
Total 60 60 60 60 
3. The Member States in the north and 
south are very similar in terms of their 
commitment to the European Union 
Agreement  21 23 6 4 
Disagreement 32 30 42 42 
Other 7 7 12 14 
Total 60 60 60 60 
4. The European Union would be better 
off without weak economies like 
southern Member States 
Agreement  16 18 21 16 
Disagreement 17 15 26 28 
Other 27 27 13 16 
Total 60 60 60 60 
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals 
from northern EU Member States in this 
country 
Agreement  30 28 12 14 
Disagreement 18 20 39 37 
Other 12 12 9 9 
Total 60 60 60 60 
6. The cultural, social, economic or 
political practices of northern Europeans 
do not fit into the way of living in this 
country 
Agreement  29 27 14 20 
Disagreement 14 12 27 25 
Other 17 21 19 15 
Total 60 60 60 60 
 
 
Though not used as selection criteria for the sampling of the survey, the age group, gender, 
level of education and status of employment of participants in Germany and the Netherlands 
were at relative variance with each other. For nationals, the younger contribution was 
recorded in Germany (with 20 adolescents and 22 young adults), where the number of the 
employed (44 counts) and those with a degree from a tertiary level school (38 out of 60 
participants) turned out to be again higher than those in the Netherlands. The older 
participants came out in the Netherlands (with 20 counts of adults), where female 
participation (38 vs 22 males) outscored that in Germany (with 34 female and 26 male 
respondents). As for GIPS nationals, the younger representation was observed in the 
Netherlands (with 11 adolescents and 23 young adults), while the older participation took 
place in Germany (with 34 adults). The female participation concerning the non-nationals was 
broader in the Netherlands (with 26 counts) than in Germany (with 22 female respondents). 
The level of education in Germany was slightly higher (with 49 participants holding a degree 
from a university/vocational school), by comparison to the 47 counts in the Netherlands, 
where the number of the employed was somewhat lower than that in Germany (50 to 52 
counts). 
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Overall, bringing the two sample groups (nationals and GIPS citizens) together, majority of 
the participants were represented by the adults (98 out of 240 samples in grand total), the 
employed (187 versus 53 reportedly jobless) and the respondents with higher degrees of 
education outnumbering those of secondary or lower level more than twice as many (171 to 
69). It turned out as a matter of coincidence that the overall numbers of participating males 
and females in the survey were exactly the same (120 each), despite the diametrically opposite 
entries on both sides (48 males and 72 females of nationals versus 72 males and 48 females of 
GIPS citizens). Last, one needs to note that the counts of GIPS citizens’ employment rates 
came about as fairly decent figures when compared to data applying to the nationals (with 52 
to 44 counts in Germany and 50 to 41 in the Netherlands): 
 
Table 10: Cross-comparison of sample profiles according to age, gender, level of education and employment 
status in Germany and the Netherlands 
 
Citizenship  Member States 
Age groups Gender 
Level of 
education 
Status of 
employment 
Total 
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Own nationals 
Germany 20 22 18 26 34 22 38 44 16 60 
Netherlands 14 26 20 22 38 23 37 41 19 60 
Total 34 48 38 48 72 45 75 85 35 120 
GIPS nationals 
Germany 8 18 34 38 22 11 49 52 8 60 
Netherlands 11 23 26 34 26 13 47 50 10 60 
Total 19 41 60 72 48 24 96 102 18 120 
Grand Total 53 89 98 120 120 69 171 187 53 240 
 
The null hypothesis which this study set out to test envisaged no significant signs of 
resentment between the northern and southern Member State citizens at present. The findings 
in both selected cases were in denial of this presumption, though. The variations between the 
nationals from the EU’s northern and the southern regions were accordingly distinct in great 
measures to the extent that they responded to the six questionnaire items during the survey 
interviews. 
 
To be able to conclude that the survey findings suggest failure to reject the null hypothesis, 
the test statistics performed in accordance with Pearson’s chi-square test of independence had 
to reveal statistically insignificant values as far the differences between the German/Dutch 
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nationals on one side and the GIPS citizens on the other were concerned. Given the 5% level 
of significance, this meant, the preset α:0.05 alpha level was by no means to be overreached. 
The P-values calculated separately for each of the six questionnaire items in the selected cases 
appeared, however, as follows: 
 
Table 11: Comparison of P-values in Germany and the Netherlands 
 
Questions 
P-values 
Germany Netherlands 
1. The recent Eurozone crisis mirrors a permanent divide between the 
north and south of the EU 
0,0313 0,0020 
2. The northern EU members’ support for more tax increases and 
spending cuts in the southern EU members damage the ideals of 
European solidarity 
0,0004 0,0015 
3. The Member States in the north and south are very similar in terms of 
their commitment to the European Union 
0,0041 0,0001 
4. The European Union would be better off without weak economies 
like southern Member States 
0,0001 0,0324 
5. I am not prejudiced against nationals from southern EU Member 
States in this country 
0,0004 0,0062 
6. The cultural, social, economic or political practices of southern 
Europeans do not fit into the way of living in this country 
0,0088 0,0367 
 
 
With variations from one country to the other, these values are by no means above the alpha 
level, in fact fairly close to the probability level of 0. As it appeared in most cases, apart from 
both sample groups’ responses to the fourth question inquiring about an EU without weak 
southern economies as well as preferences of the GIPS citizens to the last question on their 
compatibility with the German/Dutch ways of living, the two sets of participants tended to opt 
for fairly different choices across the given response scale. All in one, the self-evident split 
between the northern and southern EU member citizens’ perceptions of one another as such 
demand that the null hypothesis be rejected. 
 
It should be noted that these findings are based on a small-scale study, limited largely by its 
time span and sample size, and might not be adequate to conclude that there is now an 
enduring divide between citizens of the two regions. Still, they obviously suggest that the 
roots of distantiation are not merely economic, as the recent Eurozone crisis appeared to put 
forward at first glance, but in fact come about as deep-seated sociocultural and political 
prejudices of history. From the Northern side, the latest Southern woes are little more than a 
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consequence of self-inflicted failures. Accordingly, the political/societal consensus around 
robust policy-making structures in the North are unequivocally at odds with the South’s 
clientelist frame of mind, which is why economic reforms in the latter can hardly ever reach 
their intended goals (Tassinari 2014). 
 
The cleavage between the North and South in Europe is to many a manifestation of historical 
contradistinctions, such as the varying work ethic or religion in the two regions. That the 
densely Protestant North differs from the largely Catholic and Orthodox South –inspired 
significantly by Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism- explains to this 
understanding why capitalism emanated from the United Kingdom, Germany and the 
Netherlands to scale up further by dint of industrialisation and modernisation. The chief 
characteristic defining these historical keystones was for the most part individualism, the 
southern equivalent of which was delineated by a collective logic. In a parallel vein, some 
authors claimed that economies in the Northern Member States prospered far better also 
because of their earlier generation of the human capital crucial to economy (Becker and 
Woessmann 2009). As of the end of 19th century, accordingly, the acquisitions of the 
Reformation became manifest particularly in Prussia to lead to not only higher economic 
prosperity but also to better education. 
 
From the Southerners’ perspective, on the other side, most of these judgments labeling them 
‘incompetent’, ‘profligate’ or ‘lazy’ carry the traces of old stereotypes (Murdock and Gripsrud 
2015). To the latest OECD statistics (2014), for instance, Greeks work far more hours than 
citizens of the northern EU lands. The mismatch between the two regions would then -at least 
for the moment- not necessarily stem from the work-shy or rule-bending peoples of the South 
but instead be an issue of productivity and/or competiveness. Whether instances of myth, 
misinformation or bias, nonetheless, it is not an easy task to dislodge such preconceptions 
when the current political indicators validate patterns of nepotism and corruption in the EU’s 
Southern members, which by comparison to those in the North prove to be significantly 
higher (Koch 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
The bailout negotiations over the future of Greece in the Eurozone came to demonstrate how 
variant the levels of institutional competences between the EU’s northern and southern 
members could be. To be fair, in the absence of a fiscal union with strongly-built stabilising 
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mechanisms (Lucarelli 2012; Müller 2012), where several Member States had constantly been 
displaying uneven growth and exporting capacities, deficits and government debts to GDP, 
the latest crisis was a ‘chronicle of a crisis foretold’ (Garton Ash 2012). Regardless of the fact 
that a setback of this magnitude was under these circumstances inescapable, the resentment 
between the Northern and Southern members intensified lately. Hardly a day went by -
particularly in the past two years- without the ‘family members’ throwing accusations as to 
who was responsible for the biggest debt problem in the EU history. In parallel, as this study 
came to reveal, there arose significant signs of distantiation between citizens of the two 
regions. As a matter of fact, the growing split between the better-off North and the crisis-
prone South as such echoed once again loud and clear the EU’s long-standing legitimacy 
problem. 
 
Against a long background of the elite-driven European integration process, whereby 
preferences of citizens were often shoved on the back burner (Moravcsik 2002), Europe’s 
chronic democratic deficits revived anew with the Eurozone crisis, amidst debates of putting 
the single-currency zone’s interests before those of its constituent members. While this latter 
motive came across as intrusion upon national policy-making
2
, with no mounting evidence of 
a common political identity in sight, the federalists’ hope for a European ‘demos’ sprang to 
life by anti-European movements (Peet and Guardia 2014). 
 
The anti-EU/anti-Euro left and right-wing political parties have actually been gaining ground 
in both northern and southern Members. Yet, the rise of ideological divisions in the latter 
economies have more potential to declare a divorce from the Union. The developments in 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are therefore under closer scrutiny, for these could be far 
more devastating than in, say, Germany, the Netherlands, France or the UK, which were not 
really ravaged by the recent economic crisis as much as the former, but still are home to the 
biggest populist parties in Europe. A host of ‘Tea Party’ movements such as the Pegida and 
Afd in Germany, the Dutch Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the National Front in France 
and UKIP in Britain are now all but just a few ultra-nationalists on the fringes, some of which 
polled as high as 20 percent in the latest national elections. The common thread to these 
movements is the anti-immigration discourse. As the non-competitive economies in the 
periphery -be they from within or without the EU- exported to these lands far more migrants 
than before, the political fault-lines took a turn for the extremists in the latter. And next up on 
                                                 
2
 The bailout plans required ‘co-management’ of the Greek economy with ‘foreign’ stakeholders (the so-called 
‘Troika’, i.e. the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank). 
22 
 
the front burner is the UK, which with increasing campaigns against free movement of 
workers will  in the coming days decide to stay/leave out the EU. 
 
What is somewhat paradoxical about the European scene today is that there are certain 
countries who seek to join the EU, attracted by its seemingly working systems of democracy, 
rule of law and human rights, despite controversy over their European background, while a 
growing sense of disappointment has been spreading in several Member States to overshadow 
their future in the Union. It goes without saying that the recent debt crisis has highlighted a 
defective financial system in the Eurozone. With ethnocentrism and national flag-waving 
reaching a peak these days, however, its implications go far beyond the single-currency zone. 
As the Union expanded gradually and yet could not overcome its most ‘existential’ challenge, 
i.e. coming up with an emphatic, all-embracing and cohesive identity for being ‘united in 
diversity’, it is far from elusory why “Southerners complain about ‘rich and greedy’ 
Northerners, and Northerners rue their connections to ‘lazy and profligate’ Southerners” 
(Espada 2012, p. 15). And in all likelihood, the reopened wounds between the two regions 
will remain for good. 
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